

(Alternate draft of first section of DISCUSSION.)

The Current Situation

1. Troop movements by both India and Pakistan since June have greatly increased tension between the countries and the possibility of major hostilities. The armed forces of both countries are fully deployed in Kashmir and on the Punjab and Bengal frontiers, and war might break out without further major indications of intent from either side.

2. The focus of dispute at the present time is the projected election, in the period 10-30 September, of a Constituent Assembly in that section of Kashmir now occupied by Indian forces. Such elections are bitterly opposed by Pakistan.

3. Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, Dr. Frank Graham is now in the subcontinent seeking to achieve agreement on demilitarization of Kashmir as a prelude to an impartial plebiscite to determine its permanent affiliation. Graham is due to report to the Council on 29 September 1951, though he may seek delay.

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(This draft would require the following introductory paragraph to the section on Indian and Pakistani military capabilities.)

[x.] India now has about 65,000 troops in Kashmir, and a striking force of about 75,000, including an armored division and brigade, in the East Punjab opposite Lahore. Pakistan has about 18,000 men, with another 15,000 in reserve, deployed for use in Kashmir, and about 57,000 men in the Punjab border area, with another 7500 in reserve. On the present East Pakistan front, India has 20,000 men against about 10,000 Pakistani.

CONCLUSIONS (Alternate Draft)

1. The military forces of both India and Pakistan are deployed in full readiness for war over the Kashmir issue.

2. The Indian Government is extremely unlikely to precipitate war, but is fully prepared to accept war and will not act to reduce the tension.

3. While the Pakistan Government is unlikely to precipitate war, there is a chance that it will do so to thwart India's plan for electing a Kashmiri Constituent Assembly. The danger of such action will be greatest between 15 September and 1 November. It may decline thereafter if the UN takes effective action toward an impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.

4. Apart from the intentions of the two governments, there is a substantial chance that hostilities will be brought on by army and political pressures arising from the general tension, which is unlikely to lessen in the period of this estimate.